Davy Crockett Weapon System: King of the Atomic Frontier

A cold war conundrum led to a weapon too dangerous to use.

Apr 09, 2024

Davy Crockett Weapon System at the National Infantry Museum, Fort Moore, Georgia. Photo credit: King Kaptures Photography. Used with permission.

Back in the swinging '60s, the U.S. Army and its NATO allies had a colossal problem: keeping the Soviet Union from invading Europe. Soviet conventional ground forces outnumbered them two to one in terms of tanks and men. An area known as the Fulda Gap was the most obvious route for the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to mount a surprise attack into Europe.

If the Soviets decided to kick in the front door between East and West Germany, cross the Rhine River, permanently shift the global balance of power, and generally ruin American college students’ plans to backpack across Europe during their gap year, it was unlikely—perhaps even wildly unlikely—that NATO could stop them.

Both sides became obsessed with the idea of a major tank battle along the Fulda Gap and meticulously dissected every possible outcome of this armored melee. NATO had to find a way to shift the odds closer to at least 50/50.

The Army needed a strategy, an idea, or a weapon that would give them a fighting chance if push came to shove with the Russian bear. They found an idea that was just crazy enough to work: the Battle Group Atomic Delivery System (BGADS), later renamed the M28/M29 Davy Crockett nuclear weapon system.

If you aren’t from the United States, Davy Crockett (1786 – 1836) was an American folk hero, frontiersman, soldier, and politician. He served as a US congressman and later died at the Battle of the Alamo during the Texas Revolution.

The Atomic Watermelon

In the late 1950s, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, now the Los Alamos National Laboratory, designed the W54 warhead, and the Atomic Energy Commission built it. The W54 was the smallest nuclear weapon ever fielded by the United States.

Versions of the W54 were used in the AIM-26 Falcon air-to-air missile, Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM) system or nuclear landmine, and, you guessed it, the Davy Crockett recoilless gun.

The version used in the Davy Crockett had an official yield of 20 tons of TNT (84 GJ). The nuclear landmine could have a yield from 10 to 1,000 tons (42 to 4,184 GJ). The Falcon air-to-air missile, carried by F-102 Delta Dagger fighter jets, had a yield of 250 tons (1,050 GJ), which seems like a lot given that it was designed to take out aircraft and could potentially be used over friendly territory.

The version of the W54 used by the Davy Crockett was said to have a 100% instant casualty radius of more than 520 ft (160 m) from radiation even through a tank’s armor, and the area would remain lethal for 48 hours.

So they took the W54 mini-nuke and packaged it in the 76-pound (34 kg) M388 atomic projectile, which had a diameter of eleven inches and a length of thirty-one inches with four fins on the back to give it some stability in flight. Soldiers began to refer to it as the “atomic watermelon.” Now, all they needed was a way to fling it at the enemy.

Enter the Davy Crockett. It came in two flavors: the light M28 120mm recoilless rifle and the heavy M29 155mm recoilless rifle. The M28 had a range of 1.25 miles (2.0 km), which I would describe as not far enough from the atomic detonation. The M29 had a range of 2.5 miles (4.0 km) which was better, but still not far enough. In fact, the Army recommended that Davy Crockett crews pick firing positions in sheltered locations, such as the rear slope of a hill, and instructed them to keep their heads and necks covered during the warhead’s detonation.

The weapon could be set up on a tripod or Jeep-mounted with a five-man crew. (Multiple sources say it had a crew of three, but the field manual clearly shows five. The number of crew members may have changed over time.) The M28 weighed 185 lb (84 kg), and the M29 weighed 440 lb (200 kg). Both launchers worked the same way. The crew inserted the propellant charge down the muzzle, followed by a titanium launch piston to which the atomic projectile was attached that would detach in flight. The Davy Crockett was not designed for rapid fire. While it was called a recoilless rifle, the launcher was smoothbore, and the projectile was about as aerodynamic as a pickup truck, so accuracy was a problem.

They thought about using a trebuchet, but someone pointed out that it sounded French. Plus, it was hard to stow it in an M113 armored personnel carrier without parts sticking out.

The Davy Crockett was deployed to Europe in 1961 to armor and infantry battalions, particularly those defending the Fulda Gap in West Germany. Davy Crockett systems were also sent to Guam, Hawaii, Okinawa, and South Korea.

The only time the Davy Crockett was fired with a live nuclear round was on July 17, 1962, in the Little Feller I test shot. The projectile detonated on target, 2,853 meters (1.7 miles) from the launcher. Observers were seated in bleachers about 2.2 miles (3.5 km) from ground zero. In attendance were Robert F. Kennedy, U.S. Attorney General and brother to President John Kennedy, and presidential adviser and future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor.

I found a Monday, August 07, 1961, Johnson City, TN Press-Chronicle article announcing that the Davy Crockett Weapon System was to be displayed at the annual Davy Crockett Day celebration at a park near Limestone, TN. A UPI article in the Wednesday, July 18, 1962, San Francisco Examiner titled “Bobby Sees Davy Crockett” mentioned the successful test. It seems a safe bet that the U.S. government wanted the Soviet Union to know about the new low-yield tactical nuke.

Department of the Army (1961). Field Manual 23-20, Davy Crockett Weapons System in Infantry and Armor Units. U.S. Government Printing Office. Pg. 37, Public Domain

Command and Control and Costs and Armageddon

The Davy Crockett's nuclear warhead, the M388, was removed from Europe in August 1967, and the last warhead was retired in 1971. At a 1969 Tactical Nuclear Weapons Symposium, Congressman Chet Holifield asked Brigadier General Alvin Cowan why the Davy Crockett was scrapped.

“Since it was essentially a platoon weapon, command and control was a problem, and there was great fear that some sergeant would start a nuclear war,” said General Cowan.

Cowan also said the weapon's net worth was higher than the cost of keeping the system in the field. If anything, this was an understatement.

The system was also extraordinarily expensive. Over five years, from 1958 to 1963, total expenses were almost $20 million, roughly $200 million today. It turns out that developing and fielding a small, low-yield nuke costs about the same as that of a large, high-yield one.

From an article on the Davy Crockett by the Brookings Institution:

“The Davy Crockett was deployed with U.S. Army forces from 1961 to 1971. Between 1956 and 1963, 2,100 were produced at an estimated cost (excluding the warhead) of $540 million (in constant 1996 dollars).”

There are multiple reasons why the Davy Crockett nuclear weapon system was an idea with potentially disastrous consequences. From a philosophical standpoint, it put the decision about whether or not to launch a nuclear device in the hands of a small group of men who might be in an incredibly terrifying and confusing situation. Its use was based on the assumption that using tactical nukes would not lead to a nuclear exchange. Let's all be glad that no one rolled those flaming nuclear dice.

From a practical standpoint, the weapon’s range and accuracy were problematic at best. Finally, the list of things that could go wrong is lengthy. What if the launcher malfunctions? What if the vehicle carrying multiple warheads is hit by artillery or tank fire? What if one of these atomic watermelons is lost or left behind in the confusion of a firefight?

If the warhead detonated prematurely within 500 to 1,000 meters of the crew or their supporting units, everyone was going to have a bad day. You have to wonder how well the warheads tolerated the rough handling that came with everyday, in-the-field use. I promise you, they got dropped, bumped, and kicked around.

Operator error was also a possibility. I found the timer on the back of the projectile particularly terrifying. From the 1961 field manual:

“If the dial is set on a greater setting than required, the projectile will impact, causing a functional failure (DUD). The time-setting dial serves as an additional safety. When the timer dial is set at the safe position (S), the fuze cannot become armed regardless of other conditions. A minimum of 1 second must be set on the timer dial in order for the fuze to function.”

The development of effective anti-tank weapons like the BGM-71 TOW (Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided) missile and the attack helicopter, beginning with the Bell AH-1 Huey Cobra, are what really killed the Davy Crockett weapon system. These weapons were more effective, more versatile, cheaper, and didn’t raise the stakes in a nuclear poker game.

Pop Culture

I couldn’t find mention of the Davy Crockett nuclear weapon system in any books or movies. It looks like they don’t display them at county fairs in Tennessee anymore, either. If you would like to see the Davy Crockett nuclear weapon system up close and personal, several museums have them on display in the following U.S. states: Florida, Georgia, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, Tennessee, and Virginia,

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